Emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases continue to pose significant threats to public health, economic stability, and sustainable development across Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Although these outbreaks often originate from zoonotic sources, their consequences extend far beyond human health, disrupting agricultural systems, livelihoods, and regional stability. Over the past two decades, the region has experienced a substantial rise in Public Health Emergencies (PHEs), driven largely by infectious agents that exploit existing vulnerabilities. According to the World Health Organization, zoonotic disease outbreaks in SSA increased by 63% between 2012 and 2022, compared to the previous decade (WHO, 2022). Furthermore, approximately 30% of all PHEs in Africa are linked to zoonotic events, with a marked surge between 2019 and 2020 when zoonotic pathogens accounted for more than half of all reported emergencies (WHO, 2021).
This worrying trend is shaped by interconnected structural drivers, including rapid urbanization, expanding human–wildlife contact, ecosystem degradation, and climate-sensitive shifts in pathogen ecology (Grace et al., 2017). Socioeconomic vulnerabilities such as malnutrition, inadequate immunization coverage, and limited access to healthcare further amplify disease risks (Africa CDC, 2023). These dynamics collectively highlight the region’s heightened exposure to both natural and anthropogenic biological threats.
Biosafety, Biosecurity and the Growing Importance of Biorisk Governance in SSA
Against this backdrop, biosafety and biosecurity have emerged as critical components of regional and global health security. Biosafety focuses on preventing accidental exposure to or release of biological agents through safe laboratory practices and containment systems (WHO, 2020). Biosecurity, on the other hand, aims to prevent unauthorized access, misuse, theft, or deliberate dissemination of biological materials, equipment, and expertise (UNODA, 2020). As SSA countries continue to expand their research, diagnostic, and biotechnology capacities, the absence of strong governance frameworks increases the risk of laboratory accidents, dual-use research misuse, and exploitation by non-state actors (Koblentz, 2021).
The increasing frequency of biological events, combined with rapid technological advancements in genetic engineering, expanding laboratory networks, and evolving security threats, necessitates alignment with global biosafety and biosecurity norms. Global instruments such as the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), International Health Regulations (IHR 2005), Global Health Security
Agenda (GHSA), and United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (UNSCR 1540) provide essential obligations and frameworks for guiding national systems (UNSC, 2004; WHO, 2005; GHSA, 2014). However, their practical implementation across SSA remains uneven due to systemic challenges and wide variation in national capacities.
Operational Realities and Capacity Gaps in the Region
Many SSA countries face chronic underinvestment in public health systems, fragmented governance structures, limited laboratory infrastructure, weak regulatory enforcement, and shortages of biosafety officers and trained biorisk management personnel (Ntoumi & Zumla, 2021). These gaps were exposed repeatedly during major outbreaks. The 2014–2016 Ebola epidemic in West Africa demonstrated the consequences of inadequate surveillance systems, absence of functional emergency operations centers, and weak cross-border coordination, despite affected countries being IHR State Parties (Moon et al., 2015). COVID-19 further revealed deficits in laboratory biosecurity governance, including insufficient genomic sequencing capacity, weak material transfer controls, and limited oversight of dual-use research (Nkengasong & Tessema, 2020). Mpox outbreaks since 2022 highlighted the absence of national diagnostic guidelines and inconsistent biosafety level practices for orthopoxviral handling (WHO, 2023). Recurrent cholera outbreaks continue to underscore failures in environmental biosafety, WASH systems, and risk communication (UNICEF, 2022), while recent Marburg virus outbreaks in Ghana, Tanzania, DRC, and Equatorial Guinea exposed persistent gaps in specimen transport, preparedness planning, and implementation of minimum biosafety standards (WHO, 2023).
Collectively, these events reveal a persistent disconnect between policy frameworks and operational readiness. Although many SSA countries have drafted national biosafety guidelines or BWC-related legislation, few have fully implemented or updated them, and several lack functional national authorities for biosafety and biosecurity oversight (UNODA, 2022). Submissions of BWC Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) remain low, reflecting institutional fragility and technical capacity gaps (BWC ISU, 2023). Regional disparities also persist: countries such as South Africa, Kenya, Uganda, and Nigeria have made measurable progress in developing laboratory regulatory systems and epidemic intelligence units, whereas others lack basic biosafety legislation or coherent national coordination structures (Africa CDC, 2023).
Regional institutions play a growing role in closing these deficits. The Africa CDC coordinates continental biosafety and biosecurity programs, including the Biosafety and Biosecurity Initiative and support for Member States in developing national biorisk frameworks and JEE implementation (Africa CDC, 2022). Sub-regional bodies including ECOWAS and the East African Community (EAC) also strengthen cross-border surveillance, laboratory networks, and emergency response mechanisms, thereby promoting harmonization and capacity-building across Member States (ECOWAS WAHO, 2021).
Given the region’s high burden of infectious disease outbreaks and its increasing involvement in biotechnology, a comprehensive assessment of biosafety and biosecurity systems is urgently needed. Understanding current capacities, identifying policy and institutional shortcomings, and mapping persistent vulnerabilities will support efforts to strengthen preparedness and response to emerging biological threats. Therefore, this narrative review seeks to:
1.Examine global discourses and frameworks guiding biosafety and biosecurity, including the BWC, IHR, GHSA, and UNSCR 1540;
2.Assess policy and institutional architectures governing biosafety and biosecurity practices within Sub-Saharan Africa; and
3.Identify persistent capacity gaps, challenges, and regional vulnerabilities that shape preparedness for emerging biological threats.
guiding national systems (UNSC, 2004; WHO, 2005; GHSA, 2014). However, their practical implementation across SSA remains uneven due to systemic challenges and wide variation in national capacities.