African leadership to believe in its own capabilities.
Dr Afzal Ashraf
Earlier this year, I had the privilege of contributing to the panel “Private Military Companies and Foreign Military Bases: Implications for African Security and Sovereignty,” during the inaugural International Security Conference on Africa (ISCA) held in Kigali.
The theme, articulated in President Kagame’s keynote at the outset of the conference that under the title “Africa’s future, particularly in matters of peace and security, cannot be outsourced“; shaped my thinking, and that of many others. Indeed, reclaiming African agency is vital to preserving its peace, security and sovereignty. Allow me to elaborate.
Adverse effects of outsourcing security
Reclaiming African agency in matters of peace and security is, first and foremost, an intellectual exercise. It begins with correctly defining the problem, followed by formulating the appropriate solution. In this regard, the distinction President Kagame drew between peace and security is key to devising effective policies. By contrast, conflating the two can result in dangerous misjudgements, both in policy and in practice.
Consider this. Security policies and decisions can often come at the expense of peace.It is typically a perceived threat to security that leads African states to contract foreign private military companies (PMCs) or even host foreign military bases. But while foreign PMCs are often brought in to resolve crises, they frequently end up perpetuating conflicts. This is not surprising given that their primary motive is commercial. If the security problem is resolved and no other emerges, the contract ends. There is, therefore, a commercial incentive for PMCs to be seen as winning battles without ever winning the war. In the end, what was proposed as a solution to security challenges becomes a threat to peace.
Foreign PMCs are also a threat to sovereignty. At issue are loyalty and motivation. African governments have tended to hire PMCs from former colonial powers. Many of the individuals who run these companies previously served in their countries’ defence, security, or intelligence services. These states continue to have interests in Africa, which PMCs are likely to be encouraged to “assist” with. There is a clear conflict of interest between the hiring state and the states from which these security contractors originate. Failing to recognise this is naïve, and naivety is the enemy of both security and sovereignty. It seems strange that when choosing a tutor or school for our children, even the slightest hint of harm or exploitation would be a disqualifier. Why should it be any different for a nation’s security? Why not apply the same level of due diligence?
Africa’s self-doubt: a stumbling block to peace, security and sovereignty
Most African governments understand the issues raised here. But they still hire foreign PMCs because they believe they lack the capacity to address security threats themselves, even though Rwanda’s history proves otherwise.
As I said:
“If there’s a country that knows this is a lie, it’s Rwanda. This government came into power by defeating a far better-equipped military supported by the might of the French.”
A broader historical review of warfare reinforces the view that African security institutions can overcome the challenges the continent faces. Since Vietnam, in almost every case where vastly superior militaries fought weaker adversaries, they lost. This means that military might alone does not deliver victory.
Clearly, the issue is not African incapacity; it is a lack of belief in African potential.
This self-doubt is not confined to the security sectors; it starts with a lack of belief in African cognitive capability, which is aggravated by the persistence of externally imposed narratives. Africans do not define peace, security and sovereignty or the policies to achieve and preserve them from their own perspectives.
Related to this is the equally troubling reliance on military doctrines imported from very different historical and cultural contexts. African sovereignty must also include doctrinal sovereignty. African conception of threats, power, and legitimacy must emerge from African experiences, ideas, and values – not from out-of-date Enlightenment Europe or Cold War America.
Another related concern is the increasing and hidden costs of technological dependency. Today, almost all weapons and security systems are software-controlled. Each one purchased from an external source represents a potential loss of sovereignty, because software can be programmed to restrict weapon function, leak sensitive information, or allow external manipulation. This effectively enables foreign powers to limit or influence African security capabilities.
Restoring African agency
Restoring African agency is particularly urgent for two main reasons. First, the world is undergoing a transition between declining and emerging orders. Africa must strategically navigate between the Western legacy of militarised influence and China’s development first approach. China, which also endured colonialism, transformed its global position not through war but primarily through economic development. That may be a model Africa can adapt and improve upon.
Second, and most significantly, Africa has long been a resource-rich region over which jealous foreign interests salivate. Age-old strategies of divide and rule are now sugar-coated with development aid or human rights narratives for contemporary acceptability. Perceived threats, especially neighbourly threats, are often invented or exaggerated by those seeking to sell weapons, services, or influence. Rejecting or locally defusing such threat narratives not only saves money and lives but also increases the prospects for both security and peace. Doing so requires intellectual self-confidence and regional collaboration.
In the geopotical context context, African leaders ought to trust their own institutions and build capacity rooted in self-respect and common sense rather than defer to foreign expertise. Dr Luka Deng, another distinguished panelist, appeared to reinforce this view, warning that outsourcing security weakens the state and distorts national priorities.
In short, African states must reclaim two essential sovereignties.
1. First is Threat Sovereignty: Africa must define its own threat landscape rather than adopt foreign imposed narratives. The world order is changing. This is the moment to insert a different and authentically African logic.
2. Second is Doctrinal Sovereignty: Africans must shape security doctrines rooted in their own ideas, experiences, and ethical traditions, rather than importing frameworks designed for a different context. During the panel, the most thought-provoking question for me came from Her Excellency Louise Mushikiwabo:
“What is sovereignty when a state kills its own people? When leaders cannot travel
within their own country?”
This question challenges us to confront sovereignty not as an abstract legal concept but as an ethical and functional relationship between governments and citizens. Above all, it points to leadership and to the love, or fraternity, that binds a nation: a sense of solidarity among people. It is a moral obligation toward others, fostering community and mutual aid. This is the most powerful weapon in security and one that can help bridge the crevice between security and peace that President Kagame identified.
If Africa is to move beyond dependency, it must take the lead in shaping its own security future, not through surrender, but through strategy, solidarity, and sovereignty. My call is one for strategic confidence: a call for African leadership to believe in its own capabilities.